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The Case of David v. Goliath: Jewell v.
NBC and the Basics of Defamacast in
Georgia
L. Lin Wood*
Television in its young life has had many hours of
greatness . . . and it has had its endless hours of mediocrity
and its moments of public disgrace. There are estimates
that today the average viewer spends about two hundred
minutes daily with television, while the average reader
spends thirty-eight minutes with magazines and forty
minutes with newspapers. Television has grown faster
than a teenager, and now it is time to grow up. What you
gentlemen broadcast through the people’s air affects the
people’s taste, their knowledge, their opinions, their understanding of themselves and their world. And their future.
—Newton Minow, Chairman of Federal
Communications Commission (1961-63)1
I want to discuss the importance of the television news
medium to the American people. No nation depends more
on the intelligent judgment of its citizens. No medium has
a more profound influence over public opinion. Nowhere
* Partner, Wood & Grant, Atlanta, GA. Mercer University, A.B. 1974; Walter F. George School of Law, Mercer University, J.D. 1977. The author was the
lead civil attorney for Richard Jewell in his defamacast action against NBC and
Tom Brokaw. The facts of the case are set forth with the consent of the author’s
client, Richard Jewell.
1. Newton Minow, Chairman, Federal Communications Commission, Address Before the National Association of Broadcasters, Washington, D.C. (May 9,
1961), in WILLIAM SAFIRE, LEND ME YOUR EARS: GREAT SPEECHES IN HISTORY 664-65
(1992).
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in our system are there fewer checks on vast power. So
nowhere should there be more conscientious responsibility
exercised than by the news media. The question is, Are we
demanding enough of our television news presentations?
And, are the men of this medium demanding enough of
themselves? . . . In Will Rogers’ observation, what you
knew was what you read in the newspaper. Today, for
growing millions of Americans, it is what they see and hear
on their television sets.
— Vice President Spiro T. Agnew (1969-73)2
Then David put his hand in his bag and took out a
stone; and he slung it and struck the Philistine in his forehead, so that the stone sank into his forehead, and he fell on
his face to the earth.
—1 Samuel 17:48
INTRODUCTION
At some point in your career, you may find an individual
sitting across from you in your conference room complaining of being “defamed” by false statements made during a
television or radio broadcast. Unless you are the rare plaintiffs’ lawyer able to build a successful practice specializing in
the area of defamation law, you will next need to take a trip
from your conference room to your law library to educate
yourself on the intricacies of the law of defamation. Your research will undoubtedly leave you frustrated in your attempt to understand the confusing laws of libel, slander, and
“defamacast.”3
This Essay attempts to clarify these confusing areas of
2. Vice President Spiro T. Agnew, Address Before a Republican Gathering
in Des Moines, Iowa (1969), in SAFIRE, supra note 1, at 654.
3. See infra notes 8-12 and accompanying text (defining the term “defamacast” and discussing its origin).
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law by first setting forth the basic starting points for a case of
defamacast in Georgia. This Essay then examines the factual
setting of Jewell v. NBC4 and applies the defamacast law to
those facts, in order to provide a contextual framework for
understanding defamacast law.
I. THE LAW OF DEFAMACAST
When a defamation action is brought by an individual
against a member of the press, the court is faced with competing legal interests. On the one hand, the individual has a
common law right to the protection of his own good name.
On the other hand, the First Amendment of the United States
Constitution guarantees freedom of speech and the press.5
A. Definition
A “defamacast” is a defamation6 broadcast over either the
television or radio airwaves.7 The term originated, coincidentally, in Georgia, where it was coined by Judge Homer C.
Eberhardt in the landmark decision of American Broadcasting4. The case was settled out of court for an undisclosed amount of money.
See NBC, Lawyers for Jewell Settle Libel Allegations, WASH. POST, Dec. 10, 1996, at A3
(discussing monetary settlement between Jewell and NBC for an undisclosed
amount); see generally Symposium, Accountability of the Media in Investigations, 7
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 401 (1997) (colloquium between William Small and Richard Jewell’s attorney, L. Lin Wood, discussing the controversy surrounding Richard Jewell).
5. U.S. CONST. amend. I; see Diamond v. American Family Corp., 368 S.E.2d
350, 351 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988), cert. denied, 186 Ga. App. 917 (1988).
6. Defamation is defined as a communication that tends “to harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter
third persons from associating or dealing with him.” W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF
THE LAW OF TORTS § 112 (4th ed. 1971). Defamation law protects a party’s “interest in reputation and good name” by compensating for harm to reputation and
by giving defamed persons an opportunity to vindicate their reputation in a public forum. Id.
7. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 417 (6th ed. 1990) (defining defamacast as
defamation by broadcast); L. ELDREDGE, THE LAW OF DEFAMATION § 13 (1978) (defining defamacast as an oral defamation communicated through the broadcast
media); see, e.g., Williamson v. Lucas, 304 S.E.2d 412 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983) (finding
radio broadcast defamed public figure).
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Paramount Theatres, Inc. v. Simpson,8 a case that arose out of a
television broadcast of The Untouchables. In American Broadcasting, Judge Eberhardt traced the development of the
common law actions of libel and slander9 and recognized the

8. 126 S.E.2d 873 (Ga. Ct. App. 1962); see Pierce v. Pacific & Southern Co.,
303 S.E.2d 316, 318 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983) (“In the case of American Broadcasting v.
Simpson, Judge Homer C. Eberhardt . . . coined a new word, now in general use,
which is quite descriptive of being defamed by television, to wit ‘defamacast.’”)
(quoting Montgomery v. Pacific & S. Co., 206 S.E.2d 631, 634 (Ga. Ct. App.), aff’d,
210 S.E.2d 714 (Ga. Sup. Ct. 1974). In formulating this new area of law, the court
stated “[d]efamation by broadcast or defamacast presents a factual situation unknown to the common law and is in a new category.” Id. at 879. The court
added, “this case involve[s] a new type of publication of defamatory matter (a
defamacast).” Id. at 881; see also ELDREDGE, supra note 7 (discussing the emergence of a new type of defamation, defamacast).
In addition to Georgia courts, at least one district court has adopted the term
defamacast. See Spelson v. CBS, 581 F. Supp. 1195, 1203 (N.D. Ill. 1984).
9. At common law, the constitutional law of defamation consisted of the
“twin torts of libel and slander.” PROSSER, supra note 6, § 111, at 737. While similar in all respects, except that libel is written defamation and slander is verbal,
the two types of defamation developed different rules. Jeffrey F. Ghent, Annotation, Defamation by Radio or Television, 50 A.L.R.3d 1311, §§ 4-5 (1974). Courts
have recognized defamation by radio and television as a new species of tort, calling it defamacast, in which distinctions between libel and slander are not applicable. Id.
The court recognized how the emergence of new media had been the impetus for new law. American Broadcasting, 126 S.E.2d at 877. The common law first
recognized a right of action only for slander. Id. It was not until the development of the printing press did an action for printed defamation, called libel,
arise. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 568 Hist. n. b (1938)). Recognizing the
lack of precedent for an action in defamation, the court noted that in the absence
of binding precedent, the court “will reach a decision based upon sound principles and fair deductions from the common law.” Tucker v. Howard L. Carmichael & Sons, 65 S.E.2d 909, 910 (Ga. Sup. Ct. 1951) (Per Duckworth, C.J.). The
court went on to state: “The genius of the common law has been its ability to
meet the challenges posed by changing circumstances.” American Broadcasting,
126 S.E.2d at 878. As Judge Feld noted:
If the base of liability for defamation is to be broadened in the case of
radio broadcasting, justification should be sought not in the fiction that
reading from a paper ipso facto constitutes a publication by writing, but
in a frank recognition that sound policy requires such a result. . . . That
defamation by radio, in the absence of a script or transcription, lacks the
measure of durability possessed by written libel, in nowise lessens its
capacity for harm. Since the element of damage is, historically, the basis
of the common-law action for defamation . . ., and since it is as reasonable to presume damage from the nature of the medium employed
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emergence of defamation by broadcast, terming it defamacast.10
B. Statutory Basis of Claim
Georgia has codified its common law of libel and slander.11 The code addresses liability for defamatory statements in visual or sound broadcast and recoverable damages:
(a) The owner, licensee, or operator of a visual or
sound broadcasting station or network of stations and
when a slander is broadcast by radio as when published by writing,
both logic and policy point the conclusion that defamation by radio
should be action per se.
Hartmann v. Winchell, 73 N.E.2d 30 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1947).
Although defamacast includes elements of both libel and slander, such that
certain traditional principles of both libel and slander apply, such categorization
does not control in an action for defamacast. American Broadcasting, 126 S.E.2d at
876, 880 n.8. Many courts have had difficulty reconciling defamacast with the
traditional libel-slander dichotomy. Id. at 877. Some courts have said that distinctions between libel and slander are inapplicable in cases of defamation by
radio or television. See, e.g., Niehoff v. Congress Square Hotel Co., 103 A.2d 219
(Sup. Jud. Ct. Me. 1954); Kelly v. Hoffman, 61 A.2d 143 (Ct. Err. & App. 1948);
Greer v. Skyway Broadcasting Co., 124 S.E.2d 98 (N.C. Sup. Ct. 1962); Summit
Hotel Co. v. National Broadcasting Co., 8 A.2d 302 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1939). Courts
disagree as to whether defamation by radio and television is a new tort or
whether it is properly classified as libel or slander. See Jeffrey F. Ghent, Annotation, Defamation by Radio or Television, 50 A.L.R.3d 1311, 1319 (1990). Where a
written script is used, most courts treat defamation by radio and television as
libel, see, e.g., Martins v. Coelho, 478 N.Y.2d 58 (App. Div. 1984); First Independent
Baptist Church v. Southerland, 373 So. 2d 647 (Ala. Sup. Ct. 1979); Gray v. WALATV, 384 So. 2d 1062 (Ala. Sup. Ct. 1980), whereas California courts treat it as
slander, see, e.g., White v. Valenta, 234 Cal. App. 2d 243 (1965); Arno v. Stewart,
245 Cal. App. 2d 955 (1966). One commentator states that the modern trend is to
treat broadcast statements as libel. R. Hayes Johnson, Defamation in Cyberspace:
A Court Takes a Wrong Turn on the Information Superhighway in Stratton Oakmont,
Inc. v. Prodigy Servs., 49 ARK. L. REV. 589, 624 (1996).
10. Two of the most well-renowned commentators in the area of tort law
were not fond of Judge Eberhardt’s chosen term, referring to the term defamacast as “a barbarous new word.” PROSSER, supra note 6, § 112, at 787. Even Judge
Eberhardt himself noted, while coining the term defamacast, that “[w]hile this may be
‘a glossoligical illegitimate,’ ‘a neological love-child’ we can think of nothing
better.” American Broadcasting, 126 S.E.2d at 879 n.7 (citation omitted).
11. O.C.G.A. § 51-5 (1994); see Blackstone v. Fisher, 97 S.E.2d 322, 324 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1957).
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the agents or employees of any owner, licensee, or
operator shall not be liable for any damages for any
defamatory statement published or uttered in or as a
part of a visual or sound broadcast by one other than
the owner, licensee, or operator or an agent or employee thereof, unless it is alleged and proved by the
complaining party that the owner, licensee, operator
or the agent or employee has failed to exercise due
care to prevent the publication or utterance of the
statement in the broadcast.
(b) In no event shall any owner, licensee, or operator or the agents or employees of any owner, licensee,
or operator of such a station or network of stations be
held liable for any damages for any defamatory
statement uttered over the facilities of the station or
network by or on behalf of any candidate for public
office.
(c) In any action for damages for any defamatory
statement published or uttered in or as a part of a visual or sound broadcast, the complaining party shall
be allowed only such actual, consequential, or punitive damages as have been alleged and proved.12
C. Basic Elements of Claim
A plaintiff bringing a defamacast action must prove that
the alleged defamatory statement was in fact defamatory.13
The burden of proof the plaintiff must meet in this regard is
dependent upon whether the plaintiff is a public or private
individual.14
12. O.C.G.A. § 51-5-10.
13. Id.
14. The actual malice standard, as set forth in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254 (1964), requires a plaintiff in a defamation action who is deemed to
be a public figure or public official to prove that the defendant made the defamatory statement with “actual malice,” defined as “knowledge of the falsity or reckless disregard of the truth.” Id. at 279-80. The public plaintiff is required to
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1. Utterance of a False Statement
In an action for defamacast, the plaintiff must first prove
that the statements complained of were false at the time they
were made.15 While this initial step appears elementary, the
question of whether the statements were false is often both
the most difficult and the most important question to prove
in the case. Consequently, early in a defamacast case, perhaps before filing the complaint or even agreeing to pursue
the case, an attorney bringing a defamacast action should
consider conducting a focus group to help determine
whether the issue of falsity presents a difficult issue in the
case. Even if falsity appears to be a major problem, pursuit
of a close case might be justified if the case has other, more
positive aspects, such as extraordinary damage.
a. Truth as an Absolute Defense
The truth of a statement is an absolute defense to a defamation action because falsity must be proven as part of the
plaintiff’s case in chief.16 Accordingly, if the defendant can
prove actual malice not merely by a preponderance of the evidence, but with
“clear and convincing clarity.” Id. at 285-86. In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418
U.S. 323 (1974), the Supreme Court summarized who will be considered a “public figure,” and thus subject to the Sullivan standards:
[The public figure] designation may rest on either of two alternative
bases. In some instances an individual may achieve such pervasive
fame or notoriety that he becomes a public figure for all purposes and
in all contexts. More commonly, an individual voluntarily injects himself or is drawn into a particular public controversy and thereby becomes a public figure for a limited range of issues. In either case such
persons assume special prominence in the resolution of public questions.
Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345.
15. O.C.G.A. § 15-5-1; Pierce, 303 S.E.2d at 319; Jones v. Neighborhood
Newspapers, 236 S.E.2d 23, 25 (Ga. Ct. App. 1977).
16. O.C.G.A. § 51-5-6 (“The truth of the charge made may always be proved
in justification of an alleged libel or slander.”); see Masson v. New York, 501 U.S.
496, 516-17 (1991); Bird v. Weis Broadcasting Corp., 388 S.E.2d 710, 711 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1989), cert. denied, 193 Ga. App. 657 (1990); Montgomery, 210 S.E.2d at 720
(“[T]here is no dispute that truth is a complete defense except in a few jurisdictions which make some exception.”); Savannah News Press v. Hartridge, 138
S.E.2d 173, 175 (Ga. Ct. App. 1964); Pierce, 303 S.E.2d at 319.
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prove that the allegedly defamatory statement is in fact true,
the law requires a directed verdict in favor of the defendant.
Many a defense lawyer will be quick to quote Blackstone as
support for this proposition, as Justice Hiram K. Undercofler
did in his dissenting opinion in Pacific & Southern Co. v.
Montgomery:
We suppose there has never been a time since recognition of the action when truth was not an absolute
defense. Blackstone asserted: ‘Also if the defendant
be able to justify, and prove the words to be true, no
action will lie, even though special damage hath ensued; for then it is no slander or false tale. As if I can
prove a tradesman a bankrupt, the physician a quack,
the lawyer a knave, and the divine a heretic, this will
destroy their respective actions; for though there may
be damage sufficient accruing from it, yet, if the fact
be true it is damnun absque injuria; and where there is
no injury, the law gives no remedy. . . . The truth is an
answer to the action, not because it negatives the
charge of malice . . . but because it shows that the
plaintiff is not entitled to recover damages. For the
law will not permit a man to recover damages in respect to an injury to a character which he does not, or
ought not, to possess.’17
2. The False Statement Must Be Defamatory
Defamacast is actionable whether the underlying defamation action is based on libel or on slander.18 Because de17. 210 S.E.2d 714, 720 (citations omitted).
18. The Georgia Court of Appeals recognizes a separate cause of action for
defamation by broadcast, “defamacast,” which includes both libel and slander.
See, e.g., Pierce, 303 S.E.2d at 318 (“Defamation by telecast is now actionable by
law regardless of whether it is in libel or slander.”); S & W Seafoods Co. v. Jacor
Broadcasting of Atlanta, 390 S.E.2d 228 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989), cert. denied, 194 Ga.
App. 912 (1990); Brewer v. Rogers, 439 S.E.2d 77 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993), cert. denied,
114 S. Ct. 2712 (1994); Montgomery v. Pacific & S. Co., 202 S.E.2d 631, 634, aff’d,
Pacific & S. Co. v. Montgomery, 233 Ga. 175 (1974); American Broadcasting, 126
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famacast contains elements of the laws of both libel and
slander, an attorney bringing a defamacast action must consider whether the false statement meets Georgia’s statutory
definition of libel,19 or whether it falls within Georgia’s
statutory definition of slander.20
a. The Statement Must Be Viewed in Context
In a defamacast action, a defamatory statement may be
made in indirect terms or by insinuation; accordingly, “the
publication thereof must be construed as a whole.”21 Likewise, it is true that defamation can be found not only in the
actual words used, but also in the innuendo that may arise
from the words.22
S.E.2d at 879; WSAV-TV v. Baxter, 166 S.E.2d 416 (Ga. Ct. App. 1969).
19. O.C.G.A. § 51-5-1(a). A libel is a “false and malicious defamation of another, expressed in print, writing, pictures, or signs, tending to injure the reputation of the person and expose him to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule.” Id.
20. O.C.G.A. § 51-5-4(a). Slander or oral defamation is defined as:
(a)(1) Imputing to another a crime punishable by law;
(2) Charging a person with having some contagious disorder or
with being guilty of some debasing act which may exclude him from
society;
(3) Making charges against another in reference to his trade, office,
or profession, calculated to injure him therein; or
(4) Uttering any disparaging words productive of special damage
which flows naturally therefrom.
Id.
21. Thomason v. Times-Journal, Inc., 379 S.E.2d 551, 553 (Ga. Ct. App.), cert.
denied, 190 Ga. App. 899 (1989) (citing Garland v. State, 84 S.E.2d 9, 11 (Ga. Sup.
Ct. 1954)). The language must first be ambiguous before context will be considered, Southeastern Newspapers Inc. v. Walker, 44 S.E.2d 697, 700 (Ga. Ct. App. 1947)
(stating that where “words are ambiguous . . . the plaintiff may . . . aver the
meaning with which he claims that it was published”), because “if the words are
clearly not defamatory, they cannot have their meaning enlarged by innuendo,”
id.; see also Aiken v. Constitution Publishing Co., 33 S.E.2d 555 (Ga. Ct. App. 1945).
22. Montgomery, 202 S.E.2d at 634 (stating that “[w]ords apparently innocent
may convey a libelous charge when considered in connection with innuendo and
circumstances surrounding the publication”); see also Davis v. Macon Tel. Publishing Co., 92 S.E.2d 619, 633, 635 (Ga. Ct. App. 1956)).
A related concept is the “extrinsic fact” approach, which allows a plaintiff to
use extrinsic evidence to show that a defamatory statement refers to her, although she is not named in the statement. American Broadcasting, 126 S.E.2d at
880 (“[O]ne not named in the publication may show by extrinsic facts that the
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Defense lawyers will invariably accuse the plaintiff of relying on “isolated statements” and taking the alleged defamatory statements “out of context.” While defamatory
statements must be viewed in context with other pertinent
comments or an entire conversation or report, correct, nondefamatory statements in one part of a conversation or report should not excuse or justify false, defamatory statements in another part of the conversation or report.
b. Statements of Opinion
It is also espoused by many First Amendment defense
lawyers that “opinion” cannot be the basis for a defamation
action. In fact, “[t]here is no ‘wholesale defamation exemption for anything that might be labeled opinion,’”23 because
any such exemption would ignore the fact that expressions
of opinion often imply an assertion of objective fact.
c. The Average Listener Test
The issue of defamation is, as a general rule, a matter of
fact to be determined by a jury, except in the clearest of
cases.24 The jury evaluates whether the allegedly defamatory statement is in fact defamatory by looking at what the
average listener would construe the words to mean.25

defamation applies to him.”). Whether the plaintiff is within the group defamed
is a question for the jury. Id. at 880-81.
23. Eidson v. Berry, 415 S.E.2d 16 (Ga. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 202 Ga. App.
905 (1992) (citing Milkovich v. Lorrain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990)).
24. Brewer v. Rogers, 439 S.E.2d 77 (1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2712 (1994).
25. Macon Tel. Publishing Co. v. Elliott, 302 S.E.2d 692, 694 (Ct.), (cert. vacated, 309 S.E.2d 142 (per curiam)), cert. denied 466 U.S. 971 (1983) (“[I]n considering whether a writing is defamatory as a matter of law, we look not at the evidence of what the extrinsic circumstances were at the time indicated in the
writing, but at what construction would be placed upon it by average reader.”)
(citing Southeastern Newspapers v. Walker, 44 S.E.2d 697, 700 (1947)); Atlanta
Journal Co. v. Doyal, 60 S.E.2d 802 (Ga. Ct. App. 1950); Garland v. State, 84
S.E.2d 9 (Ga. Sup. Ct. 1954). The Georgia Supreme Court recognized this concept
as early as in Little v. Barlow, 26 Ga. 423 (1858).
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3. Private Individual or Public Official/Figure?
Whether a plaintiff is a “public official” is generally not
the source of a great deal of legal research or factual development in discovery.26 However, whether an apparently
private citizen will be deemed a “public figure” for purposes
of a lawsuit is fertile ground for a legal battle that may not
be resolved until appeal.27
26. The Supreme Court defined the terms “public official” and “public officer” in Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966), explaining that public officials are
government employees who hold “a position in government that [has] such apparent importance that the public has an independent interest in the quality if
the person who holds it, beyond the general public interest in the quality and
performance of all government employees.” Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. at 86. Public officers are persons “in the hierarchy of government employees who have, or appear to the public to have, substantial responsibility for or control over the conduct of government affairs.” Id. at 85. Although the Supreme Court has stated
that public officers do not include all public employees, see Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 119 n.8 (1979), the Court’s definition does not clearly distinguish between public officials and mere government employees. See id.
27. The Supreme Court has defined a public figure as a person who has assumed the risk of adverse publicity and criticism by affirmatively entering the
public eye. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344-45. This inexact standard has been deemed
“much like trying to nail a jellyfish to the wall.” Rosanova v. Playboy Enters.,
411 F. Supp. 440, 443 (S.D. Ga. 1976). The rationale is that a public figure has an
effective self-help remedy to use the mass media to rebut defamatory falsehoods:
they are both less vulnerable to injury because of their opportunity to remedy the
injury, and less deserving of recovery because they affirmatively put themselves
in the public eye. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344-45.
The scope of the privilege afforded a particular public figure depends upon
the type of public figure the individual is. Id. The Supreme Court has recognized three types of public figures: the all-purpose public figure, the limitedpurpose public figure, and the involuntary-public figure. Id. General purpose
public figures are individuals who have national and “pervasive fame or notoriety,” id. at 351; Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 453 (1976) (requiring “public
figure” to have national, not merely local, notoriety), or “occupy positions of
such pervasive power and influence that they are deemed public figures for all
purposes,” Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345, and are protected by the Sullivan standard in all
aspects of their lives. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345; see also J. BARRON & C. DENIES,
HANDBOOK OF FREE SPEECH AND FREE PRESS § 6:12 (1979).
Limited purpose public figures are persons who “thrust themselves to the
forefront of particular public controversies in order to influence the resolution of
the issue involved.” Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345. Therefore, the Sullivan privilege attaches only to the individual’s discussion of the public controversy involved.
Firestone, 424 U.S. at 454-55. Involuntary public figures, individuals who are
thrust into the public limelight by no affirmative action on their own part, are
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In a defamacast action, unless the contention does not
pass the straight face-test, the defense will invariably claim
that the plaintiff is a “public figure.” The defense logic is
simple: most individuals who merit comment on television
must have some personal appeal to the public or must be involved in some public controversy. The media defendant
will often assert a defense which, in practical effect, was created by its own act of placing a private individual in the
public eye. The plaintiff cannot over-prepare its legal research and factual development in discovery on this issue
because the law to be applied and the plaintiff’s burden of
proof at trial will depend on its resolution.
a. Categorization of Person in General
Whether an individual is a public figure is a mixed question of law and fact to be determined on a case-by-case basis
by the court, rather than by the jury.28
b. Private Individuals
A private individual may recover if it is demonstrated,
by a preponderance of the evidence, that the broadcaster
failed to use “ordinary care” to determine the truth or falsity
of the statement.29 A broadcaster may be held liable even for
truly rare and receive Sullivan protection for the limited reason for which they
were put in the public eye. Id.
28. Brewer v. Rogers, 439 S.E.2d at 81 (citing Sewell v. Eubanks, 352 S.E.2d
802, 803-04 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987); Williams v. Trust Co. of Ga., 230 S.E.2d 45, 49
(Ga. Ct. App. 1976)); see also Ellerbee v. Mills, 422 S.E.2d 539, 542 (Ga. Sup. Ct.
1992) (Fletcher, J., concurring).
29. Diamond, 368 S.E.2d at 353, overruling Montgomery v. Pacific & S. Co.,
206 S.E.2d 631 (Ga. Ct. App. 1974); WSAV-TV v. Baxter, 166 S.E.2d 416 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1969). The Georgia Supreme Court applied to broadcasters the relaxed
standard of ordinary care established in Gertz for publishers, and which had
been adopted by the majority of states. Triangle Publications v. Chumley, 317
S.E.2d 534, 536 (Ga. Sup. Ct. 1984). The standard of ordinary care requires a
broadcaster to employ “that degree of care required of a reasonable broadcaster
under the circumstances” to determine the truth or falsity of the statement. Diamond, 368 S.E.2d at 353. Whether a defendant has practiced the requisite care is a
question for the jury to decide. Triangle Publications, 317 S.E.2d at 537-38.
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a newsworthy report if it contains a defamatory statement
and if the broadcaster failed to employ the procedures a reasonable broadcaster under the circumstances would have
employed to assure the accuracy of the statement before
broadcasting the report.30
In Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Chumley,31 the Supreme
Court of Georgia adopted the ordinary care standard for
defamation of a “private figure plaintiff” and enunciated
some guidelines for defining this standard of conduct:
At trial of the negligence issue, the standard of conduct required [of defendant] will be defined by reference to the procedures a reasonable publisher in [defendant’s] position would have employed prior to
publishing an advertisement such as this one. [Defendants] will be held to the skill and experience
normally exercised by members of their profession.
Custom in the trade is relevant but not controlling.
When applying the ordinary care standard . . . , the
jury is authorized to consider, among other factors:
(1) whether the material was topical and required
prompt publication, or whether sufficient time was
available for a thorough investigation of its contents;
(2) the newsworthiness of the material and public interest in promoting its publication; (3) the extent of
damage to the plaintiff’s reputation should the publication prove to be false; . . . and (4) the reliability and
truthworthiness [sic] of the source. The thoroughness
of the accuracy check a reasonable person would
make before publishing a defamatory statement will
vary, depending on the relative weight of these factors and the circumstances of the case.32

30. Diamond, 368 S.E.2d at 353.
31. 317 S.E.2d 534 (Ga. Sup. Ct. 1984).
32. Id. at 537 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 580(b), cmt. g (1972)).
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c. Public Officials and Public Figures
If the public plaintiff33 is a public official or public figure,
however, the plaintiff must show actual malice, not simply a
failure of ordinary care. Furthermore, actual malice must be
shown by clear and convincing proof, rather than by a preponderance of the evidence.34 These showings are constitutionally required under New York Times v. Sullivan,35 which
held that a public figure may not recover damages for a defamatory falsehood without clear and convincing proof that
the false statement was made with actual malice, and defined actual malice as making a defamatory statement with
knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of
whether it was false or not.36 Under Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc.,37 “an individual may achieve such pervasive fame or
notoriety that he becomes a public figure for all purposes
and in all contexts[, or,] [m]ore commonly, an individual
voluntarily injects himself or is drawn into a particular public controversy and thereby becomes a public figure for a
limited range of issues.”38 In either case, such persons as33. For purposes of this Essay, the term “public plaintiffs” refers to public
officials and public figures collectively.
34. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 285-86 (requiring a public plaintiff to prove with
“convincing clarity” that defendant made statement with actual malice). The Sullivan progeny revised the clear and convincing standard. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); Dunn & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.,
472 U.S. 749 (1985). In order to establish liability for defamation under the rule of
Sullivan and its progeny, public officials and public figures must not only prove “actual malice”—defined as “knowledge of the falsity or reckless disregard of the truth,”
Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279-80, but also must do so with clear and convincing clarity. Id.
at 285-86. To prove actual malice, a public plaintiff must show that defendant at
least “entertained serious doubts as to the truth” of the supposedly defamatory
statement. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968).
35. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
36. See supra note 14 and accompanying text (defining “actual malice”); see
also supra note 34 and accompanying text (discussing convincing clarity standard
of proof).
37. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
38. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345, 351; see, e.g., Byers v. Southeastern Newspaper
Corp., 288 S.E.2d 698 (Ga. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 161 Ga. App. 717 (1982) (holding
the dean of a state college a public figure for the limited purpose of his participa-
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sume special prominence in the resolution of public questions.
4. Respondeat Superior
In a slander action, a corporation or employer cannot be
held liable for the defamatory statement of an agent or employee unless it affirmatively appears that the agent or employee was expressly directed or authorized to slander the
plaintiff.39 Because a defamacast is not considered to be
slander, it has been held that the libel rule recognizing respondeat superior liability is applicable to an action for defamacast.40
5. Damages
Good name in man and woman, dear my lord,
Is the immediate jewel of their souls:
Who steals my purse steals trash; ‘tis
something, nothing;
‘Twas mine, ‘tis his, and has been slave
to thousands;
But he that filches from me my good name
Robs me of that which not enriches him,
And makes me poor indeed.41
Private plaintiffs may recover compensatory damages on
proof of mere fault, but may not recover punitive damages
absent proof the defendant acted with actual malice.42
tion in controversy relating to his tenure as dean of college). In Gertz, the Supreme Court addressed the issues raised in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, which had
held that the Sullivan privilege extend not only to public plaintiffs, but also to all
“matters of public or general concern.” Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29,
44 (1971), overruled by Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). Gertz
overruled Metromedia by limiting the expansion of Sullivan to only the discussion
of public officials and public figures. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 323.
39. Garren v. Southland Corp., 228 S.E.2d 870 (Ga. Sup. Ct. 1976).
40. Williamson v. Lucas, 304 S.E.2d 412 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983).
41. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, OTHELLO act 3, sc. 3.
42. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 350. Proof of actual malice is required to impose liability for statements defaming a public figure. See Byers v. Southeastern Newspa-
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a. Actual or Consequential Damages
Actual damages is not necessarily restricted to monetary
loss.43 Indeed, “[w]ounding a man’s feelings is as much actual damage as breaking his limbs.”44
b. Punitive Damages
In a defamacast action recovery for punitive damages for
a private individual or a public plaintiff is not permissible
without a showing that the broadcaster possessed knowledge of the falsity of the defamatory statement or exercised
reckless disregard for the truth, that is, that he acted with actual malice as required by Sullivan.45
6. Retraction Demand
While not expressly mandatory, the retraction demand
procedure established by Georgia statutory law should be
deemed as mandatory as a practical matter.46 The retraction
per Corp., 288 S.E.2d 698, (Ga. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 161 Ga. App. 717 (1982);
Sewell v. Eubanks, 352 S.E.2d 802, 803 (Ct. App. Ga. 1987).
The United States Supreme Court in Gertz permitted the states to define for
themselves the appropriate standard of liability for defamation, restricting them
only from imposing liability without fault. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 360. The guidelines
set forth in Gertz permit recovery of punitive damages for defamation only on a
showing of actual malice. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 396. Although Gertz relaxed the
standard of proof necessary for a plaintiff to recover actual damages for defamation, the evidence must still meet the more demanding standard of “actual malice” for recovery of punitive damages. Diamond, 368 S.E.2d at 354. Defamacast
statutes, on the other hand, permit the recovery of those actual consequential
and punitive damages as are alleged and proved. Fuqua Television, Inc. v. Fleming, 215 S.E.2d 694, 696 (Ga. Ct. App. 1975).
43. O.C.G.A. § 51-5-10(c).
44. Fuqua, 215 S.E.2d at 696 (quoting Head v. Georgia Pac. Ry. Co., 7 S.E. 217
(Ga. Sup. Ct. 1887); Mabry v. City Electric Ry Co., 42 S.E. 1025 (Ga. Sup. Ct.
1902)).
45. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 349; Diamond v. American Family Corp., 368 S.E.2d
350 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988), cert. denied, 186 Ga. App. 917 (1988). Because actual malice is part of the public plaintiff’s case in chief, the issue does not affect the public plaintiff’s case. Fuqua, 215 S.E.2d at 696 (stating that recovery is available for
both actual and punitive damages).
46. O.C.G.A. § 51-5-12 (Supp. 1996).
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demand provision will inevitably impact the damage issues
at trial and may control the admissibility of evidence concerning the demand or lack of demand for retraction:
(a) In any civil action for a defamatory statement
which charges the visual or sound broadcast of an erroneous statement alleged to be defamatory, it shall
be relevant and competent evidence for either party
to prove that the plaintiff requested retraction or
omitted to request retraction.
(b) In any such action, the defendant may allege and
give proof of the following matters, as applicable:
(1) (A) That the matter alleged to have been
broadcast and to be defamatory was published
without malice;
(B) That the defendant, in a regular broadcast of
the station over which the broadcast in question
was made, within three days after receiving written demand, corrected and retracted the allegedly
defamatory statement in as conspicuous and public a manner as that in which the alleged defamatory statement was broadcast; and
(C) That, if the plaintiff so requested, the retraction
and correction were accompanied, on the same
day, by an editorial in which the allegedly defamatory statement was specifically repudiated; or
(2) That no request for correction and retraction
was made by the plaintiff.
(c) Upon proof of the facts specified in paragraph (1)
or (2) of subsection (b) of this Code section, the plaintiff shall not be entitled to any punitive damages and
the defendant shall be liable only to pay actual damages. The defendant may plead the broadcast of the
correction, retraction, or explanation, including the
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editorial, if demanded, in mitigation of damages.47
In the event the issuance of a retraction is made as contemplated by the statute, the retraction only addresses damage issues and does not bar the lawsuit for defamacast.
Sometimes defamacast actions address, what is a jury issue,
the question of whether or not the correction and retraction
was broadcast “in as conspicuous and public a manner as
that in which the alleged defamatory statement was broadcast.”48
II. JEWELL V. NBC ANALOGIZED TO DAVID AND GOLIATH
A. Richard Jewell as David
Richard Jewell was working as a private security guard
in the early morning hours of Saturday, July 27, 1996, when
he discovered the infamous unattended package now known
to contain the bomb that would explode at Centennial
Olympic Park, killing one person and injuring over one
hundred others.49 Although initially credited with saving
many lives for his role in spotting the package and in evacuating park patrons,50 Richard Jewell was later identified in
an Olympic extra edition (check if need caps on Extra Edition) of Atlanta Journal, on the afternoon of July 30, as a suspect in the FBI’s bombing investigation.51 On October 26,
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Max Frankel, An Olympian Injustice, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 1996, at 60; Mike
Lopresti, Guard’s Alertness in Park Makes Him an Unexpected Hero, USA TODAY, July
29, 1996, at 4A.
50. See Kent E. Walker, Atlanta Games Day 12. Olympic City Heroes at the Park:
Guard’s Quick Thinking Saved Lives, ATL. J. & CONST., July 30, 1996, at S29 (proclaiming
Richard Jewell a “hero” and describing how he saved hundreds of lives by his quick
thinking). On May 15, 1997, the American Police Hall of Fame honored Richard
Jewell for saving the lives of countless people by helping to evacuate Centennial
Park after spotting the suspicious package which contained the bomb. See HeroTurned-Villain-Turned Hero Honored By Cops, STAR LEDGER, May 17, 1997, at 3; Jewell
Honored for Saving People, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, May 18, 1997, at 5A.
51. Kathy Scruggs & Ron Martz, FBI Suspects “Hero” Guard May Have
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1996, the United States Department of Justice declared in
writing that, based on the evidence developed in the investigation, Richard Jewell was not considered a target of the
bombing investigation.52 Richard Jewell was never arrested;
he was never charged with any crime. In fact, Richard
Jewell was an innocent man.
B. NBC and Tom Brokaw as Goliath
Tom Brokaw53 is the anchor of NBC Nightly News. On
Tuesday, July 30, 1996, Mr. Brokaw appeared on NBC
PrimeTime Evening News, hosted by Bob Costas, which was
covering Day 12 of the 1996 Centennial Olympic Games in
Atlanta, Georgia.54 NBC was reported to have averaged a
“twenty rating”55 for the broadcast, meaning it was viewed
Planted Bomb, ATLANTA J. & CONST., July 30, 1996, Extra J. Ed., at X1; see The Atlanta Olympic Bombing Case and Possible FBI Leaks to the Media: Hearings Before the Terrorism, Technology & Government Information Subcomm. of the Senate Judiciary Comm.,
104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1996) (testimony of Louis Freeh, Director, FBI).
52. Pierre Thomas & Bill McAllister, Guard No Longer a Suspect in Olympic
Park Bombing; Justice Department Serves Formal Notice, WASH. POST., Oct. 27, 1996,
at A1.
53. One might analogize Richard Jewell and NBC and Tom Brokaw to the
Biblical characters David and Goliath. Analogizing NBC and Tom Brokaw to
Goliath in fact exceeds the implications of the Biblical story, as NBC (as well as
its parent company, General Electric) and Mr. Brokaw clearly fit the non-biblical
definition of Goliath: a person or thing of colossal power or achievement. See
WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 976 (3d ed. 1986) (defining Goliath, in the non-biblical sense, as giant). In the Biblical sense, Goliath is the Philistine giant whom David killed with a stone shot from a sling. 1 Samuel 17:4
(“And a champion went out from the camp of the Philistines, named Goliath,
from Gath, whose height was six cubits and a span.”); id. at 17:49 (“Then David
put his hand in his bag and took out a stone; and he slung it and struck the Philistine in his forehead, so that the stone sank into his forehead, and he fell on his
fact to the earth.”); see infra note 57 (quoting the biblical scene in which David
slays Goliath).
54. NBC Nightly News with Tom Brokaw (NBC television broadcast, July 30,
1996).
55. A “rating” is the percentage of television viewers tuned in to a particular
program out of all potential viewers. See How Nielsen Measures Ratings, PEORIA J.
STAR, Jan. 5, 1997, at C11. Competing companies provide rating services, one of
which is Nielsen Media Research. Id. Nielsen Media Research gathers ratings for
programs on nationwide broadcast and cable stations. Id. Five thousand households, selected at random, are fitted with a device that records programs being
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by more than twenty million households. During the broadcast, the following exchange occurred between Tom Brokaw
and Bob Costas:
MR. BROKAW: FBI agents do have [Jewell’s] apartment under surveillance tonight, and even though
there is no search warrant that we know of, none of
the high level sources that NBC has been talking to is
waving us off Mr. Jewell as the focus of this investigation. So, Bob, that is what we know at this hour.
MR. COSTAS: If, for the sake of argument, Mr. Jewell’s lawyer is correct and people are barking up the
wrong tree and he ultimately is not arrested, they
have done him a grave disservice.
MR. BROKAW: I think it is going to be acutely embarrassing for the FBI as well. I don’t know whether
they are going to arrest him tonight. The speculation
is that the FBI is close to making the case, in their language. They probably have enough to arrest him
right now, probably enough to prosecute him, but
you always want to have enough to convict him as
well. There are still some holes in this case.
MR. COSTAS: So let’s assume that that’s true and
they do arrest him and they have enough evidence.
Again, for the sake of argument, they arrest him tomorrow or the next day. You might ask, why not
wait until then before saying anything publicly? Why
toss this guy out there now?
MR. BROKAW: I think one of the reasons that they
viewed at any given time. Id. Through information compiled from these “Nielsen”
homes, television programs are given “ratings.” Id.
The popularity of a television program is also measured by “shares;” a television
program’s “share” is the percentage of televisions tuned in to a particular program,
out of all televisions in use at that time. Id. For example, if 20% of the Nielsen
households who are watching television at a given time tune in to the NBC television program “Seinfeld,” the show gets a “20 share.” See id. Consequently, a 20 share
is usually substantially fewer viewers than a 20 rating. See id.
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may be doing this is that there is, in the language of
the FBI or in the law enforcement, they sweat a guy.
And one of the ways that you do that is put the kind
of public pressure that he has on him tonight. Now,
we have to be absolutely clear that everyone understands, he is not yet officially a suspect. He is the focus of this investigation. But this is coming to us from
everywhere, Washington, Atlanta, Pete Williams who
covers the Justice Department, Fred Francis covers
everybody down here. They are only using one name
tonight, and that is Richard Jewell.
MR. COSTAS: Tom, thanks. I am sure we will be
talking to you again soon.
The ultimate question is whether Richard Jewell was the
victim of a defamacast as the result of the previous statements by Tom Brokaw.56
III. THE ANSWER: A JURY QUESTION
They probably have enough to arrest him right now, probably enough to prosecute him . . . . They are only using one
name tonight, and that is Richard Jewell.
—Tom Brokaw
The viewing public believes that the major network news
anchors report news in a truthful manner. The viewing public believes Dan Rather and Peter Jennings. The viewing
public believes Tom Brokaw.
On July 30, 1996, at a time when the FBI was not even
willing to publicly acknowledge that Richard Jewell was an
official “suspect,” the gist of Tom Brokaw’s statements to
millions of television viewers was that the FBI had its man

56. In addition to suing the broadcast network NBC, Richard Jewell’s attorneys brought, and continue to bring, actions against the print media. See Jewell
Sues Papers, College Over Olympic Blast Stories, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 29, 1997, at A5.
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and its man was Richard Jewell. Tom Brokaw turned investigative suspicions into legal probabilities. The average
viewer could not ignore the clear implication of the Brokaw
comments that there was, in all probability, damning evidence against Richard Jewell warranting his arrest and
prosecution for bombing Centennial Olympic Park.
The problem is that Tom Brokaw’s statements were false.
No evidence had been developed as of July 30 (nor at any
time thereafter) that was legally sufficient to justify the arrest
or prosecution of Richard Jewell. Richard Jewell was an innocent man.
The statements by Tom Brokaw were defamatory. The
bomber of Centennial Olympic Park faces the federal punishment of death for an act of terrorism. To state falsely to
the viewing public that evidence existed sufficient to justify
the arrest and prosecution of Richard Jewell unquestionably
injured his reputation, exposed him to public hatred, contempt, and ridicule, and imputed to him a crime punishable
by death.
The statements by Tom Brokaw were uttered with a reckless disregard for their truth or falsity. Mr. Brokaw’s characterization of the evidence against Richard Jewell was nothing more than his personal conclusions stated as objective
fact to the viewers; there was no prior substantiation whatsoever from credible law enforcement sources. Tom Brokaw
made the statements at the same time he acknowledged that
there had been no search warrant issued, that Mr. Jewell was
not an official suspect, and that there were holes in the case
against Mr. Jewell. These acknowledged facts required Mr.
Brokaw to refrain from stating that there was sufficient evidence to arrest and prosecute Mr. Jewell. These undisputed
facts, acknowledged by Mr. Brokaw, demanded further investigation by NBC into the credibility of the government
leak of Mr. Jewell’s name, not an on-the-air evaluation by
Mr. Brokaw of the evidence against Mr. Jewell.
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Early in any criminal investigation, there will usually be
a number of individuals investigated by law enforcement
authorities. Most of these early “suspects” are innocent and
are never charged with, or arrested for, any crime. The
American people cannot, and should not, tolerate their national news anchors first revealing the identity of these early
suspects of an investigation and then falsely informing the
viewing public that there is evidence justifying that individual’s arrest and prosecution. When conduct occurs, as it did
in the case of Richard Jewell, there must be accountability.
But for the out-of-court settlement by NBC with Richard
Jewell, I am confident a jury would have found Mr. Brokaw
accountable for his false statements by answering the ultimate question with a resounding, “yes.”
CONCLUSION
Ultimately, the same trial considerations apply to a defamacast action as apply to any other personal injury action.
The success of the case will most likely turn, in large part, on
how well the jury likes the plaintiff and the degree of preparation by the involved attorneys. Cases involving “honest
mistake” types of false statements are best avoided, while
concentrating on aggressively handling cases involving serious, false attacks on an individual’s character and reputation. Even cases involving a private individual as plaintiff
should develop and present “reckless disregard” evidence,
not only for the possible recovery of punitive damages, but
also to persuade the jury to the plaintiff’s side on the liability
issue in the first instance. The reality is that few plaintiffs’
attorneys can afford to “specialize” in the area of defamation,
but defense lawyers can command big reputations and even
bigger incomes serving as “defenders of the First Amendment” for their media clients. The plaintiff needs as large a
stone as possible in his or her sling.
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Finally, remember at all times: David won.57

57. 1 Samuel 17:50 (“So David prevailed over the Philistine with a sling and
a stone, and struck the Philistine and killed him.”).

